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Abstract. Error distribution models provide a simple and convenient approach for introducing
candidates' uncertainty in voting models. In such models, given a proﬁle of announced strategies by
the players, each candidate can compute the fraction of voters that will vote for him but only up to
a random error. We show that the standard practice of assuming that the random error term enters
the model additively and that it is independent of the announced policies actually leads to logical
inconsistencies. Speciﬁcally, we list three assumptions that are frequently imposed when the error
distribution approach is used. We then show that, under such assumptions, the error distribution
models imply that some candidates believe that certain logically impossible events can take place
with a strictly positive probability. We propose a modiﬁcation of error distribution models that
circumvents this problem. Moreover, for electoral competition between two candidates over a uni-
dimensional policy space, our modiﬁed model allows us to investigate the pure strategy strategy
Nash equilibria of voting games that incorporate voter bias as well as incorporating disagreement
between the candidates regarding the preferences of the voters.
Key words. Probabilistic voting models, error distribution models, voter bias, non-policy prefer-
ences, Nash Equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
In probabilistic voting models, the uncertainty facing the candidates is typically expressed in terms of
functions that assign to each candidate his subjective probability of winning the election conditional
on the announced policies by all candidates. In models with a continuum of voters, these functions
are often speciﬁed as primitives of the model Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985). However, it is
also possible to derive these functions from more basic assumptions of uncertainty regarding the
voters. This is normally done using two diﬀerent approaches. The ﬁrst approach postulates that
the candidates are uncertain about the distribution of the types of voters (the state-space approach
in Roemer (2001)), which implies uncertainty regarding the type of the median voter Ball (1999),
Alesina (1988), Hansson & Stuart (1984). The second approach introduces uncertainty to the
model by postulating that each candidate is uncertain about the fraction of voters that will vote for
him (the error distribution approach in Roemer (2001)). More speciﬁcally, once all the candidates
announce their policies, each candidate can accurately compute the fraction of voters that prefer
one policy over another. However, the candidates are uncertain about how many voters will actually
vote for them on election day. More precisely, when the policies of all the candidates are announced,
candidate 1 (without loss of generality) can compute FR, which is the fraction of voters who prefer
the policy of this candidate to his rival's, regardless to who proposed these policies. This is done
by using the information the candidate has about the distribution of the preferences (types) of the
voters. A fraction F̂R = FR + ξ of the voters will then vote for candidate 1 on election day. The
variable ξ is a random error term that is usually assumed to be independent of the policies announced
by the candidates (Saporiti (2008), Roemer (2001), Roemer (2003)). Given FR, the distribution
of ξ, and a speciﬁc rule to win the election (for example a simple majority rule), candidate 1 can
compute his probability of winning the election. Error distribution models have the advantage of
clearly distinguishing between the probability of victory of some candidate and his expected share of
votes. Winning probabilities can be more important in winner-takes-all competitions whereas votes
shares are more important when candidates maximize their share of voters. The facts that ξ enters
these models additively and that it is independent of the announced policies considerably simplify
the calculations of the winning probabilities of the candidates. This in turn leads to more tractable
analysis of the equilibria of electoral competitions (e.g Chapters 3 and 4 in Roemer (2001), and
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Saporiti (2008)). In this paper, we show that the practice of assuming that the error term ξ is both
additive and independent of the announced policies can lead to logical inconsistencies. Speciﬁcally,
we list three assumptions that are frequently imposed when the error distribution approach is used.
We then show that, under such assumptions, the  standard error distribution models imply that
some candidates believe that certain logically impossible events can take place with a strictly positive
probability. The starting point for analyzing probabilistic voting models is often establishing the
existence of Nash equilibrium for the underlying game. However, asserting the existence of pure
Nash equilibria in a game where players assign strictly positive probabilities to impossible events
invariably undermines any argument that can be used to motivate interest in such equilibria. We,
therefore, introduce a modiﬁcation of error distribution models that circumvents this problem by
abandoning the additivity of the error term while maintaining its independence of the announced
policies.
Most current models of electoral competitions assume that the candidates have identical views
regarding voters' policy preferences. In other words, the candidates agree on how the ideal policies
of the voters are distributed over the policy space (in the state-space approach, the candidates
agree on the distribution of the ideal policy of the median voter). However, pre-election debates
between candidates often reﬂect a disagreement over what the voters really want. This indicates
some heterogeneity in the beliefs that candidates have about the policy preferences of the voters.
Furthermore, candidates' uncertainty regarding the outcome of the election can arise even if voters'
policy preferences are common knowledge with certainty (see Erikson & Roomero (1990), Coughlin
(1990), Burden (1997), and Eguia (2007)). The most common reasons for such uncertainty are i)
voters' non-policy preferences such as preferences over the personal attributes of the candidates, ii)
random events that impact actual behavior of the voters on election day such as events that aﬀect
voter turnout and mistakes by voters. All these factors contain a large unobservable component,
and therefore it is convenient to model their role as a random error that impacts the the calculations
of the probability of winning the election by each candidate. The modiﬁed model error distribution
model we introduce in this paper allows us to model candidates' uncertainty in a logically consistent,
robust, and tractable manner. As Section 3 will demonstrate, for electoral competitions between
between two candidates over a uni-dimensional policy space, our model is robust in the sense that it
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does not require the candidates to hold identical beliefs about the policy preferences of the voters,
and it only imposes very general assumptions on the source of uncertainty facing the candidates.
It is tractable in the sense that, in voting games based on our model, one can readily establish the
existence of pure strategy equilibria and then investigate the impact of the parameters of the model
on these equilibria.
2. The need to modify the standard error distribution model
Consider a competition between two candidates that announce polices in a set T ⊆ IRn. We list
three assumptions that often accompany error distribution models.
Assumption A: voters are represented by a probability space (µ,Θ) where each type is represented
by a point in Θ. The types are weighted by the measure µ in the sense that for any measurable set
B ⊆ Θ, µ(B) is the fraction of the voters that belong to the set B.
The second assumption requires some deﬁnitions. Let t1 and t2 in T be respectively the policies
announced by candidate 1 and candidate 2. Deﬁne
S(t1, t2) = {θ ∈ Θ| voter θ strictly prefers policy t1}
and
I(t1, t2) = {θ ∈ Θ| voter θ is indiﬀerent between t1 and t2}
We assume that the sets I and S are µ measurable. The fraction of voters that intend to vote for
t1 is given by
FR(t1, t2) = µ(S(t1, t2)) +
1
2
µ(I(t1, t2)),
and FR(t, t) = 12 .
Assumption B: for any 0 < δ < 1, either
(a) there exist t1 and t2 in [0, 1] such that 1− δ < FR(t1, t2) < 1,
or
(b) there exist t1 and t2 in [0, 1] such that 0 < FR(t1, t2) < δ.
Assumption B is satisﬁed in most spatial voting models in the literature. Speciﬁcally, consider any
model where
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i) Θ = T = A ⊂ IRn (i.e., types are identiﬁed with their ideal policies, and µ is continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure on IRn)
(ii) for any θ and t in A, the utility of the voter of type θ from policy t is given by the function
v(θ, t) = r(||θ − t||),
where r : IR+ −→ IR is a strictly decreasing function and || · || is the norm in IRn.
(iii) there exist tˆ ∈ A and a sequence tn −→ tˆ in A such that
lim
n−→+∞µ{θ ∈ A| ||θ − tˆ|| > ||θ − t
n||} = 0
Then, any such model must satisfy Assumption B. The function r is typically given by r = −|| · ||
or r = −|| · ||2. Note that given (i) and (ii), (iii) depends only on the geometry of A as the following
examples illustrate.
Example 1. Assume that Θ = T = [0, 1], and (i) and (ii) above hold. Assume further that
r = −|| · ||. Then, for any t1 and t2,
FR(t1, t2) =

t1+t2
2 if t1 < t2
1
2 if t1 = t2
1− t1+t22 if t2 < t1
Therefore,
FR(0, t2) = µ[0,
t2
2
].
The continuity of µ implies that FR(0, t2) can be made arbitrarily close to 0 be taking t2 that is
close enough to 0, and hence (b) of Assumption B is satisﬁed.
Example 2. Consider another model where Θ = T is the unit ball in IRn. Again assume r = −|| · ||.
Let t1 be a point on the boundary of the unit ball. Let t
n
2 be a sequence of points inside the
ball that approach t1 along the ray emanating from the origin and heading towards t1. Then,
limtn2−→t1 µ(FR(t1, t
n
2 )) = 0, and Assumption B is satisﬁed.
Similarly, if Θ = T = A ⊂ IRn is a compact convex polygon with non-empty interior, then the
model will satisfy Assumption B. In fact, for models satisfying conditions (i) and (ii), a suﬃcient
condition guaranteeing that (iii) holds can be formulated in terms of the compactness of A and the
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existence of a point on the boundary of A where A is locally convex (e.g. 0 in [0, 1] and every point
on the boundary of the unit ball are examples of such a point). However, formally deriving such a
condition is beyond the scope of this note.
Our last assumption is the deﬁning feature of the standard error distribution model.
Assumption C: candidate 1 believes that the fraction of voters that will vote for him on election
day is given by
F̂R = FR(t1, t2) + ξ
where ξ is random variable over [−β, β] with cdf G that G(0) = γ > 0 and G is continuous at 0.
Normally, G is assumed to be continuous on all of [−β, β] and G(0) = 12 .
Proposition 1. Any model satisfying assumptions A through C is internally inconsistent.
Proof. Let E be the event that candidate believes that the fraction of voters voting for him is
either strictly larger than 1 or strictly less than 0. By the deﬁnition of E, clearly we should have
Pr(E) = 0. However,
Pr(E) = Pr(FR(t1, t2) + ξ > 1) + Pr(FR(t1, t2) + ξ < 0)
Hence,
Pr(E) = Pr(ξ > 1− FR(t1, t2)) + Pr(ξ < −FR(t1, t2))
and
Pr(E) = 1−G(1− FR(t1, t2)) +G(−FR(t1, t2)).
Assumption B implies that there exists t1 and t2 in [0, 1] such that either FR(t1, t2) is arbitrarily
close to 0 or FR(t1, t2) is arbitrarily close to 1. Hence, Assumption C implies that either G(1 −
FR(µ(t1, t2)) or G(−FR(t1, t2)) can be made arbitrarily close to γ. This implies that P (E) is
strictly positive, which is not possible.
Note that the assumptions of Proposition 1 impose no restrictions on the objective of the candidates,
and these assumptions do not specify the conditions for winning the election (e.g a simple majority
rule vs more complicated rules). To illustrate some of the complications that arise from error
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distribution models in a setting that satisﬁes assumptions A through C, consider the following
example.
Example 3. The error distribution models used in Saporiti (2008) satisfy Assumptions A, B, and
C. Take for example the model of Section 3.2 in Saporiti (2008) where T = Θ = [0, 1], the types
are distributed on [0, 1] with a continuous cdf F , v(θ, t) = −||θ− t||, and ξ is uniformly distributed
on [−β, β]. Assume a simple majority rule. The results in Saporiti (2008) show that in this model,
when candidates are policy and oﬃce motivated, the set of equilibria of an electoral competition
between the candidates depend on the relative values of β and the intrinsic values that candidates
attribute to winning. In particular, for certain values of these parameters, the model possesses
pure strategy equilibria. However, according to Proposition 1, the model is logically inconsistent
for any value of β. To see this, note that this model satisﬁes Assumptions A and C. As in Example
1, and for any β > 0, the model also satisﬁes Assumption B. Hence, such a model is logically
inconsistent.
The inconsistency highlighted in Example 3 above also appears in examples 3.1 and 3.2 in Roemer
(2001) as well as in some of the results derived in sections 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 in Roemer (2001). Of
course, these cases, which also satisfy conditions A through C, were used to illustrate and simplify
the derivation of well-known results. After all, the results in sections 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of Roemer
(2001) had been previously obtained using the state-space approach. Using error distribution models
in a setting that satisﬁes assumptions A, B, and C in order to introduce and prove new results is
harder to justify.
Possible modiﬁcations of the error distribution model
Alternative model 1: At ﬁrst glance, it might appear that the problem discussed above can be
avoided by simply limiting the support of ξ to insure that FR+ ξ remains inside the interval [0, 1].
However, such approach will lead to a type of candidate uncertainty that would -in eﬀect- trivialize
the model. More speciﬁcally, for any t1 and t2 in T , let δ = −FR(t1, t2) and δ = 1−FR(t1, t2). Let
ξt1,t2 be a random variable distributed on [δ, δ] with a continuous cdf Ht1,t2(ξ). Assuming a simple
majority rule, let pi denote the subjective probability of winning for player 1. Thus,
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pi(t1, t2) = Pr(F̂R(t1, t2) >
1
2
)
and
pi(t1, t2) = 1−Ht1,t2(
1
2
− FR(t1, t2))
If ξt1,t2 is symmetric on [δ, δ] (e.g. uniform on [δ, δ]), then for any t1 and t2 in T
pi(t1, t2) = 1−Ht1,t2(
1
2
− FR(t1, t2)) = 1
2
.
and pi(t1, t2) does not enter the computations of the best reply function of candidate 1. In a
Downsian competition, this implies that any platform (t1, t2) is an equilibrium, and in the Wittman
model, this implies that the only equilibrium is (t∗1, t∗2), the most preferred platforms for candidates
1 and 2 respectively.1 The same phenomenon will occur, if instead of requiring FR + ε to remain
in the same interval, we assume that for every (t1, t2), ξt1,t2 is a horizontal translation of some ﬁxed
ξ on [−12 , 12 ] i.e., if ht1,t2(ξ) = h(ξ − (12 −FR(tt, t2))) where ht1,t2 and h are respectively the pdfs of
ξt1,t2 and ξ.
Alternative model 2: A second obvious approach would be to model the uncertainty in the
following way. Deﬁne F̂R by
F̂R(t1, t2) = ξ × FR(t1, t2)) (1)
where ξ be a random variable deﬁned on [0, 1]. However, this model does not allow (unobservable)
factors that can make F̂R(t1, t2) larger than FR(t1, t2) (what if there could be a shock to the
economy or if there is a weather condition on election day that lowers the participation of voters who
prefer t2 more than it lowers the participation of those who prefer t1?). Note also that t1 = t2 = t in
this model implies pi(t, t) = Pr(ξ×FR(t, t) > 12) = Pr(ξ× 12 > 12) = 0. This means that candidate
1 believes that the voters are extremely biased against him, which would rule out any convergence
results in a Downsian setting.2
1In a Downsian model, candidates only care about winning the elections. In a Wittman model, candidates only
care about the policy implemented by the winner regardless to who wins the election.
2In a Downsian model, candidates maximize their probabilities of winning the elections. A standard result for
such models when Assumptions A,B and C hold is that in equilibrium both candidates announce the same policy
(Theorem 3.1 in Roemer (2001)).
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3. A viable modiﬁcation of the standard error distribution model
As we have just demonstrated in the previous section, the obvious modiﬁcations of the error
distribution model are not satisfactory. We therefore propose the following modiﬁcation.
Alternative model 3: The most promising approach for ﬁxing the problem with error distribution
models is an approach that is extensively used in the econometric literature on discrete choice
models. For a given (t1, t2), deﬁne the ratio
Γ(t1, t2) =
F̂R(t1, t2)
1− F̂R(t1, t2)
, (2)
as the relative weight of voters that will vote for candidate 1 on election day. The candidate uses
the distribution of types to compute FR(t1, t2). He then estimates Γ using an equation of the form
Γ(t1, t2) = ϕ(FR(t1, t2), ξ), (3)
where the exact functional form on ϕ is speciﬁed by the modeler, and the random variable ξ
represents an estimation error. The expression Γ in (2) can take any value in [0,+∞). Therefore,
as long as ϕ is such that ϕ(FR(t1, t2), ξ) ∈ [0,+∞) for any values of ξ and FR, we can avoid all
the inconsistencies caused by the classic error distribution model. The candidate ﬁnally computes
the probability of winning the election by computing
pi(t1, t2) = Pr(Γ(t1, t2) > 1).
In order to apply this model in various examples voting games, we need to choose a speciﬁc and
convenient functional form for ϕ. Henceforth, let
ϕ(FR, ξ) =
1
ξ
FR.
This means that for any (t1, t2), we have
F̂R(t1, t2) =
FR(t1, t2)
FR(t1, t2) + ξ
(4)
where ξ is random variable distributed on [0,+∞) with a continuous cdf H. Assuming a simple
majority rule, the probability of a victory for candidate 1 is given by
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pi(t1, t2) = Pr(
FR(t1, t2)
FR(t1, t2) + ξ
>
1
2
) = H(FR(t1, t2)). (5)
Unlike equation (1), equation (4) implies that we can have F̂R > FR or F̂R < FR depending on
the realization of ξ. Furthermore, the support of ξ can be a proper subset of [0,+∞]. Hence, unlike
the standard error distribution model, equation (4) allows the candidate to believe that the fraction
of voters that will vote for him on election day is bounded 0 < a < F̂R(t1, t2) < b < 1 no matter
what the platforms t1 and t2 are (e.g. consider the famous 47% comment by Mitt Romney in the
last U.S. presidential elections).3
We now incorporate model 3 in a voting game between two candidates over a uni-dimensional policy
space. In all what follows, we assume T = Θ = [0, 1] (i.e we identify each voter with his/her ideal
policy in [0, 1]). We initially assume that the candidates agree on the location of the median voter
but might disagree on the exact distribution of voters over [0, 1]. In other words, for i ∈ {1, 2},
candidate i believes that the distribution of ideal policies of the voters on [0, 1] is given by the pdf
(cdf) fi (Fi) where f1 and f2 share the same median at t
m with 0 < tm < 1.
Assumption D: Candidate 1 believes that, for any (t1, t2), the fraction of voters that prefer t1
over t2 is given by
FR1(t1, t2) =

F1(
t1+t2
2 ) if t1 < t2
1
2 if t1 = t2
1− F1( t1+t2)2 ) if t2 < t1
(6)
Similarly, candidate 2 believes that the fraction of voters that prefer t1 over t2 is given by
FR2(t1, t2) =

1− F2( t1+t22 ) if t1 < t2
1
2 if t1 = t2
F2(
t1+t2)
2 ) if t2 < t1
(7)
Moreover, we assume F1 and F2 are continuous and F1(t
m) = F2(t
m) = 1/2 for some 0 < tm < 1.
The requirement that both F1 and F2 have the same median will be eventually relaxed ( see As-
3A month before the 2012 US presidential election, presidential candidate Mitt Romeny, speaking at private fund
raising event, said that he believes that 47 percent of the voters will vote for the other candidate (president Obama)
no matter what.
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sumption D′ at the end of this Section). Equations (6) and (7) are consistent with assuming that
voters have concave and single-peaked preferences whose peaks are distributed on [0, 1] according
to Fi and that the winner is chosen using a simple majority rule. We also allow the candidates to
perceive bias from the voters. As in equation (4), for any (t1, t2), let
F̂R1(t1, t2) =
FR1(t1, t2)
FR1(t1, t2) + ξ1
(8)
where ξ1 is random variable distributed on [0,+∞) with a continuous cdf H1. The probability of a
victory for candidate 1 is given by
pi1(t1, t2) = Pr(
FR1(t1, t2)
FR1(t1, t2) + ξ1
>
1
2
) = H1(FR1(t1, t2)). (9)
Similarly, player 2 perceives that fraction
F̂R2(t1, t2) =
FR2(t1, t2)
FR2(t1, t2) + ξ2
(10)
will actually vote for him on election day where ξ2 is random variable with a cdf H2 on [0,+∞).
Then, the probability of a victory for candidate 2 is given by
pi2(t1, t2) = Pr(
FR2(t1, t2)
FR2(t1, t2) + ξ2
>
1
2
) = H2(FR2(t1, t2)). (11)
Remark 1: Assumption D and equations (9) and (11) imply he following properties of pii:
i) pi1(·, tm) and pi2(tm, ·) are continuous on [0, 1]
ii) For every t2, pi1(·, t2) is weakly increasing (i.e. non decreasing) on [0, t2) and weakly decreasing
on (t2, 1]. For t2 ≥ tm, pi1(·, t2) is actually weakly decreasing on [t2, 1]
iii) For every t1, pi2(t1, ·) is weakly increasing on [0, t1) and weakly decreasing on (t1, 1]. For t1 ≤ tm,
pi2(t1, ·) is actually weakly increasing on [0, t1].
The second half of (ii) is a result of the following two observations: First, if t2 = t
m, then pi1(·, tm)
is continuous on [0, 1], and as t1 increases over the interval [t
m, 1], FR(t1, t
m) weakly decreases and
so does pii(t1, t
m). Second, if t2 > tm, then pi1(·, t2) is no longer continuous at t1 = t2. However,
1− F1(t2) < 1/2, and therefore
lim
t↘t2
pi1(t, t2) = H1(1− F1(t2)) < H1(1/2) = pi1(t2, t2).
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The second half of (iii) is obtained using a similar argument. In particular, note that if t1 = t
m,
pi2(t
m, t2) is continuous on [0, 1], and as t2 increases over the interval [0, t
m], pi2(t1, t
m) weakly
increases. If t1 < t
m, then F2(t1) < 1/2 and
lim
t↗t1
pi2(t1, t) = H2(F2(t1)) < H2(1/2) = pi2(t1, t1).
The notation limt↘t2 denotes t approaching t2 from above and limt↗t1 denotes t approaching t1
from below.4
Most probabilistic voting models (see Calvert (1985),Hansson & Stuart (1984), Alesina (1988),
Ball (1999), Roemer (1997), Saporiti (2008), Droubvelis & Vriend (2014)) impose the following
assumptions on the winning probabilities:
Agreement Assumption: pi1(t1, t2) = 1− pi2(t1, t2)
Unbiasedness Assumption: pi1(t1, t2) = pi2(t2, t1)
Further discussion on these assumptions can be found in Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985). The
Agreement and Unbiasedness assumptions are very convenient because they simplify the compu-
tation of the payoﬀ functions of the candidates, and they imply that the sum of the payoﬀs is
well-behaved. In particular, in a Downsian model, the Agreement and Unbiasedness assumptions
imply that the game is zero-sum. More generally, these two assumptions imply that the payoﬀs of
the candidates are reciprocally upper semi-continuous, a property that is often needed to establish
the existence of equilibria in a discontinuous game (see Reny (1999) and Saporiti (2008)). However,
expressions pi1(t1, t2) and pi2(t1, t2) represents subjective probabilities. Therefore, whether or not
the above assumptions are reasonable depends on the source of uncertainty facing the candidates.
In particular, these assumption may not hold when the uncertainty aries from non-policy consider-
ations by voters. Consider a scenario where both candidates believe that voters are biased against
them for diﬀerent reasons. For example, one candidate might believe that his race causes net voter
bias against him while the other candidate might believe that his religious belief causes net voter
bias against him. In this case, both the Agreement and the Unbiasedness assumptions will, most
likely, be violated. Moreover, the bias when t1 = t2 may be more signiﬁcant than when t1 and t2 are
4Alternatively, one can use limt−→t2+ and limt1−→t1− .
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very diﬀerent. In this context, it is no longer reasonable to model the bias -as in Wittman (1983)- as
a simple vertical shift of the winning probabilities. The Agreement and the Unbiasedness assump-
tions may also fail when the uncertainty in the model results from a possible diﬀerence between the
intentions of the voters and their behavior on election day. This includes, but it is not limited to,
the possibility of voting errors. For example, ξ1 and ξ2 can represent candidates uncertainty about
how voters react to polls. Suppose after the candidates simultaneously announce (t1, t2), polls are
conducted and the results are communicated to the voters. These results may in fact impact the
turnout on election day; some voters might become complacent about the victory of their candidate,
and therefore decide not to vote.5 For more on the impact of polls and public information in general
on election outcomes, please see Goeree & Großer (2007) and Taylor & Yildirim (2009).
Remark 2: Even when f1 = f2 = f and f is uniform on [0, 1] and H1 = H2 = H, we can still
have pi1(t1, t2) 6= 1− pi2(t1, t2) (see Example 8 in Section 4). Suppose we, in fact, have f1 = f2 = f .
If H1 = H2 = H, then equations (9), (11), and Assumption D imply pi1(t1, t2) = pi2(t2, t1). If, in
addition, H(1/2) = 1/2, then we also have pi1(t, t) = pi2(t, t) = 1/2. Note that when H(1/2) 6= 1/2,
our model allows for a type of a weak bias that only appears in the case the two candidates announce
identical platforms. Finally, if H ≡ 1 on [0, 1], then pi1(t1, t2) = 1 − pi2(t1, t2), and the Agreement
assumption is satisﬁed.
Despite the fact the model 3 does not, in general, satisfy the Agreement and the Unbiasedness
assumptions, we can still obtain establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in voting models
with various types of candidates' motivation. As already noted by several authors, any such exis-
tence results will invariably require some quasi-concavity assumptions on Ui, which in turn require
concavity assumptions on the winning probabilities pii. We, therefore, require the following.
Assumption E: for any t2 ≥ tm, pi1(·, t2) is diﬀerentiable and concave in t1 on [0, t2), and for any
t1 ≤ tm, pi2(t1, ·) is diﬀerentiable and concave in t2 on (t1, 1].
Remark 3: The concavity requirements in the above assumption can be replaced by log-concavity.
Please note that we are not requiring pi1(·, t2) and pi2(t1, ·) to be concave (or log-concave) on all
5Many political analysts asserted that a low turnout played a signiﬁcant role in the loss of House Majority Leader
Eric Cantor in a GOP primary to a tea party challenger in June of 2014. Leading to the election, Cantor was projected
to win by a large margin. Only 12 percent of eligible voters actually participated in the election, and Cantor lost the
election.
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of [0, 1]. Such assumption would be -for all practical purposes- impossible to hold. To see this,
note that, for any tm < t2 < 1, pi1(·, t2) is, in general, discontinuous at t2. Therefore, it cannot be
concave since every concave function has to be continuous on the interior of its domain. Moreover,
Conditions E can be easily reduced to conditions on Hi and Fi. For t1 < t2, we have
∂pi1
∂t1
=
1
2
h1(F1(
t1 + t2
2
))f1(
t1 + t2
2
) (12)
and
∂pi2
∂t2
=
−1
2
h2(1− F2( t1 + t2
2
))f2(
t1 + t2
2
). (13)
When t2 ≥ tm, t1+t22 cannot be less than t
m
2 , and when t1 ≤ tm, t1+t22 cannot be more than 1+t
m
2 .
Therefore, taking the derivatives of (12) and (13) and re-arranging the resulting expressions we can
show that Assumption E holds, if
h′1(F1(z))
h1(F1(z))
≤ −f
′
1(z)
f21 (z)
(14)
for z in [ t
m
2 , 1], and
h′2(1− F2(z))
h2(1− F2(z)) ≤
f ′2(z)
f22 (z)
(15)
for z in [0, 1+t
m
2 ]. In particular, condition E holds if both candidates agree that the voters are
uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and H1 and H2 are concave (e.g. ξ1 and ξ2 are exponentially dis-
tributed).
Candidates with mixed motivation:
We consider a competition between two candidates who care about winning the election as well as
about the policy implemented by the winner. We follow Saporiti (2008) and model the payoﬀs of
the candidates as
Ui(t1, t2) = pii(t1, t2)[ψi(t1, t2) +Ki], (16)
where ψ1(t1, t2) = v1(t1)− v1(t2) and ψ2(t1, t2) = v2(t2)− v2(t1).
We assume that t = 0 and t = 1 are respectively the preferred of candidates one and two. More
speciﬁcally, we posit
Assumption F: Assume v1 is decreasing and concave on [0, 1], diﬀerentiable on (0, 1], and v1(0) = 0.
Similarly, v2 is increasing and concave on [0, 1], diﬀerentiable on (0, 1], and v2(1) = 0.
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Unlike the results in Ball (1999) and Saporiti (2008), Assumption D does not specify functional
forms for v1 and v2. Henceforth, we will use G = (X,U) to denote the two-player game with
X = X1×X2, X1 = X2 = [0, 1], payoﬀs given by (16), and pi1 and pi2 respectively given by (9) and
(11).
The partial derivatives ∂Ui∂ti may fail to exist at the point (t
m, tm). However, we can deﬁne direc-
tional partials.
∂U1
∂t1
−
(tm, tm) = lim
t1↗tm
∂U1
∂t1
(t1, t
m)
and
∂U2
∂t2
+
(tm, tm) = lim
t2↘tm
∂U2
∂t2
(tm, t2).
We also deﬁne the constants
α1 = sup
t2∈(tm,1]
∂U1
∂t1
(tm, t2)
and
α2 = inf
t1∈[0,tm)
∂U2
∂t2
(t1, t
m)
The following proposition illustrates how alternative model 3 can be used to generate existence
results under very weak assumptions.
Proposition 2. Consider a game G that satisﬁes Assumptions E, D, and F. Assume that the
candidates satisfy one of the following two conditions:
(a) ∂U1∂t1
−
(tm, tm) ≥ 0 and ∂U2∂t2
+
(tm, tm) ≤ 0
(b) α1 ≤ 0 and α2 ≥ 0
Then, the game G has a pure strategy equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the appendix. Our proposition is very similar in spirit to Theorem
1 in Saporiti (2008). However, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 in Saporiti (2008) diﬀer in a number of
important ways. First, we do not impose any Agreement or Unbiasedness assumptions. Second, we
do not assume that K1 = K2 nor do we assume a speciﬁc functional form for vi. Third, Theorem
1 in Saporiti (2008) is based on the problematic classic error distribution model (Assumption 2
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in Saporiti (2008)) while our proposition is valid for any error model with winning probabilities
satisfying Assumption E and the properties listed in Remark 1. This includes, among others, the
error model speciﬁed in equations (8) and (10). Finally, our concavity assumptions are imposed
on pii over speciﬁc subintervals of [0, 1] and not over the entire interval [0, 1] (see the beginning of
Remark 3).
Condition (a) in Proposition 2 insures that tm is in the best response set of every player when the
other player also plays tm, and therefore (tm, tm) is an equilibrium. This condition is satisﬁed when
both K1 and K2 are above some threshold. This should not be surprising since as K1 and K2
become very large, the candidates become essentially oﬃce motivated, and in such case a standard
argument can show that (tm, tm) is an equilibrium. Condition (a) in Proposition 2 can then inform
us on how large K1 and K2 must be before we can claim that (t
m, tm) is an equilibrium as the next
example demonstrates.
Example 4. Assume ξi = ξ2 = ξ and ξ ≡ 1 on [0, 1], and hence F̂Ri = FRi. Assume further that
f1 ≡ 1 on [0, 1] but f2 is given by the following expression
f2(z) =

16z
3 if z ≤ 1/4
4
3 if 1/4 ≤ z ≤ 3/4
−16z3 + 163 if 3/4 < z ≤ 1
(17)
Note that Agreement assumption is violated despite the fact that the median for both f1 and f2 is
1/2. For any v1 and v2 that satisfy Assumption F, simple calculations show that Assumption E is
satisﬁed, and that condition (a) of Proposition 2 is equivalent to
f1(1/2)K1 + v
′
1(1/2) ≥ 0
and
−f2(1/2)K2 + v′2(1/2) ≤ 0.
In other words, assumption (a) of Proposition 2 holds, if and only if,
K1 ≥ −v
′
1(1/2)
f1(1/2)
and K2 ≥ v
′
2(1/2)
f2(1/2)
. (18)
Intuitively, (18) says that if both candidates believes that there is mass of voters around 1/2 that
is large relative to v′i(1/2), then (t
m, tm) will be an equilibrium even when K1 and K2 are small.
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Take for example v1 = −t and v2 = −(1− t). In this case, if K1 ≥ 1 and K2 ≥ 3/4, then (1/2, 1/2)
is an equilibrium. If we take let v1 = −t2 and v2 = −(1 − t)2, then we still have v′1(1/2) = −1
and v′2(1/2) = 1, and our conclusion remains the same; for K1 ≥ 1 and K2 ≥ 3/4, (1/2, 1/2) is an
equilibrium.
As the proof of Proposition 2 will demonstrate, α1 ≤ 0 implies the following: for any t2 ≥ tm, the
best response of candidate 1 to this t2 will be in [0, t
m]. Similarly, α2 ≥ 0 implies that, for any
t1 ≤ tm, the best response of candidate 2 to this t1 will be in [tm, 1]. This means that the game G
can be replaced by a simpler game with X1 = [0, t
m] and X2 = [t
m, 1]. In general, condition (b)
will be satisﬁed when both K1 and K2 are below some threshold. Consider the following simple
example where the candidates agree on the distribution of voters but not on the distribution of ξi.
Example 5. Assume the candidates agree that voters are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] (i.e
f1 = f2 = f with f ≡ 1 on [0, 1]). For i ∈ {1, 2}, assume hi is equal to constant βi on [0, 1] and
0 ≤ βi ≤ 1.6 Assume β1 6= β2, v1(t) = −|t|, and v2(t) = −|1− t|. Then, for any Ki ≥ 0 conditions
D, E, and F hold. Note that
pi1(t, t) = β1 6= β2 = pi2(t, t),
and hence, despite its simplicity, this example does not satisfy the Agreement and Unbiasedness
assumptions. Moreover,
∂U1
∂t1
−
(1/2, 1/2) = α1 =
1
2
β1[K1 − 1], (19)
and
∂U2
∂t2
+
(1/2, 1/2) = α2 =
1
2
β2[1−K2]. (20)
When 0 ≤ Ki ≤ 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}, (19) and (20) imply that condition (b) of Proposition 2 holds.
WhenKi ≥ 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}, (19) and (20) imply that condition (a) of Proposition 2 holds. Therefore,
for any Ki ≥ 0, if both Ki ≤ 1 or if both Ki ≤ 1, then the game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
Assuming that the candidates are located at the extreme points of the interval [0, 1] is not essential
to the conclusion of this example. Let v1(z) = −|a−z| and v2 = −|b−z| with 0 < a < 1/2 < b < 1.
Consider the game played between the two candidates over the interval [a, b]. For tm ≤ t2 ≤
b, pi1(·, t2) is diﬀerentiable on (a, t2) and concave on [a, t2). For any a ≤ t1 ≤ tm, pi2(t1, ·) is
6When the support of ξi is larger than [0, 1], then βi is strictly less than 1.
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diﬀerentiable on (t1, b) and concave on (t1, b]. Clearly v1 and v2 satisfy Assumption F on [a, b].
Moreover, (19) and (20) still hold. Therefore, Proposition 2 implies that the game on [a, b] has an
equilibrium (t∗1, t∗2) with a ≤ t∗1 ≤ tm ≤ t∗2 ≤ 1. For any 0 ≤ t1 < a,
U1(t1, t
∗
2) ≤ U1(a, t∗2) ≤ U(t∗1, t∗2)
and for any b ≤ t1 ≤ 1
U1(t1, t
∗
2) ≤ U1(b, t∗2) ≤ U(t∗1, t∗2).
Therefore, for 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 1,
U1(t1, t
∗
2) ≤ U(t∗1, t∗2).
Similarly, we can show that for 0 ≤ t2 ≤ 1,
U1(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≤ U(t∗1, t∗2).
Therefore, (t∗1, t∗2) is also an equilibrium for game played on [0, 1] .
Remark 4: In examples 4 and 5 and in our examples in Section 4, the payoﬀ of each player can fail
to be quasi-concave in its own strategy over [0, 1]. Therefore, the standard results for the existence
of pure strategy equilibria, including Proposition 3.1 in Reny (1999), cannot be applied directly.
We now relax the assumption that both candidates agree on the location of the median voter,
Assumption D′: Same as Assumption D except F1(tm1 ) = F2(tm2 ) = 1/2 for 0 < tm1 < tm2 < 1.
For large K1 and K2, there is little hope to have a pure strategy equilibrium. In fact, for very large
Ki, each candidate essentially will want to maximize his probability of winning. This will imply
that BR1(t2) is undeﬁned except when t2 = t
m
1 . Yet (t
m
1 , t
m
1 ) is not an equilibrium since candidate
two will do better by slightly changing his platform. One other hand, when K1 and K2 are both
low, we have the following proposition
Assumption E′: For any t2 ≥ tm1 , pi1(·, t2) is diﬀerentiable and concave in t1 on [0, t2), and for any
t1 ≤ tm2 , pi2(t1, ·) is diﬀerentiable and concave in t2 on (t1, 1].
For example, equations (12) and (13) imply that E′ holds when, for i ∈ {1, 2}, Hi is concave on
[0, 1], F1 is concave, and F2 is convex. Note that the concavity of F1 means candidate one believes
18
that the voters are skewed toward t = 0 while the convexity of F2 implies that candidate two believes
that the voters are skewed toward t = 1.
Proposition 3. Assume the game G satisﬁes Assumptions D′, E′ and F. Assume further that
α1 ≤ 0 and α2 ≥ 0. Then, the game G has a pure strategy equilibrium.
The proof is in the Appendix. When K1 = K2 = 0, Proposition 3 can be used to establish the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for Wittman models with f1 6= f2.
Example 6. Consider a game G with K1 = K2 = 0. Assume F1 is concave, F2 is convex, and
0 < tm1 < t
m
2 < 1. Assume further that H1 = H2 = H with H ≡ 1 on [0, 1]. Let v1(t) = −t and
v2(t) = −(1 − t). Inequalities (14) and (15) imply that U1(·, t2) is concave on [0, t2), U2(t1, ·) is
convex on (t1, 1], and hence Assumption E
′ holds.
To show that α1 ≤ 0, we compute
∂U1
∂t1
(t1, t2) = 1/2f1(
t1 + t2
2
)[v1(t1)− v1(t2)] + v′1(t1)F1(
t1 + t2
2
).
Therefore,
∂U1
∂t1
[
− (tm1 , tm1 ) = v′1(tm1 )F1(tm1 ) = −F1(tm1 ) ≤ 0.
For any t2 > t1 and a concave F1, we have
∂2U1
∂t2∂t1
(t1, t2) = 1/4f
′(
t1 + t2
2
)[v1(t1)− v1(t2)]− 1/2f( t1 + t2
2
)v′1(t2) + 1/2v
′
1(t1)f(
t1 + t2
2
)
= 1/4f ′2(
t1 + t2
2
)[v1(t1)− v1(t2)] ≤ 0.
Hence, for any t2 > t
m
1 ,
∂U1
∂t1
(tm1 , t2) ≤
∂U1
∂t1
(tm1 , t
m
1 ) ≤ 0,
and α1 ≤ 0.
Similarly, we have
∂U2
∂t2
+
(tm2 , t
m
2 ) = 1− F2(tm2 ) ≥ 0.
For t1 < t2 and a convex F2, we have
∂2U2
∂t1∂t2
(t1, t2) = −1/4f ′2(
t1 + t2
2
)[v1(t1)− v1(t2)] ≤ 0.
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Hence, for any t1 < t
m
2 ,
0 ≤ ∂U2
∂t2
(tm2 , t
m
2 ) ≤
∂U2
∂t2
(t1, t
m
2 ),
and α2 ≥ 0. By Proposition 3, the game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
So far, we have assumed that candidates' uncertainty is expressed by equations 8 and 10. More
generally, this uncertainty can be expressed using equations 2 and 3. For i ∈ {1, 2}, deﬁne
Γi(t1, t2) =
F̂Ri(t1, t2)
1− F̂Ri(t1, t2)
,
and let
Γi(t1, t2) = ϕi(FRi(t1, t2), ξi),
To obtain a results similar to Proposition 2 and 3, we only need to impose conditions on ϕi and ξi
such that the resulting pii satisfy Assumption E and the properties listed in Remark 1.
4. Further examples
The typical examples of non-existence of pure equilibria in probabilistic spatial voting models violate
both of conditions (a) and (b) in Proposition 2. Therefore, such examples do not contradict our
results.
Example 7. [Example 6 in Ball (1999)] Assume the candidates agree that the voters are uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assume ξi = ξ2 = ξ and ξ is uniform on [0, 1] (no bias and
tm = 1/2). Assume further v1(t) = −0.5t2 and v2(t) = −0.5(1− t)2. When K1 = 3 and K2 = 0.05,
this game is shown not to have a pure strategy equilibrium in Ball (1999). Note that for K1 = 3,
player one fails to satisfy condition (b) in Proposition 2, and forK2 = 0.05, player two fails to satisfy
condition (a) in the same proposition. Therefore, this example does not contradict Proposition 2.
In fact, if we modify the example so that both Ki are larger or equal to 3, or so that both Ki are
less or equal to 0.05, then the game will have a pure strategy equilibrium by Proposition 2.
Example 4, 5, 6, and 7 suggest that when the heterogeneity in oﬃce motivation is not very large
(either both Ki are large or both are small) then equilibrium in pure strategy exists even when the
payoﬀs of the players are not quasi-concave in their own actions. Proposition 4 in Saporiti (2008)
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suggests a  converse of the previous statement; as the diﬀerence between K1 and K2 increases
above certain point, the game will fail to have a pure strategy equilibrium.
Our next example shows how Proposition 2 can be applied when ξ is not constant on [0, 1].
Example 8. Assume the candidates agree the the voters are uniformly distributed over [0, 1].
Assume ξ1 = ξ2 = ξ, where ξi is a random variable with values in [0,+∞) and a pdf
h(ξ) =
1
(ξ + 1)2
Then, H(ξ) = ξξ+1 , and using (9) and (11), we obtain
pi1(t1, t2) =

t1+t2
2+t1+t2
if t1 < t2
1
3 if t1 = t2
2−(t1+t2)
4−(t1+t2) if t2 < t1
Similarly,
pi2(t1, t2) =

2−(t1+t2)
4−(t1+t2) if t1 < t2
1
3 if t1 = t2
t1+t2
2+t1+t2
if t2 < t1
Our particular choice of h implies that both candidates believe that the voters are biased against
them; given identical platforms each candidate believes that his chance of winning the election is
only 13 and pi1 6= 1− pi2,
Now assume v1(t) = −t, v2(t) = −(1 − t). The facts that f1 = f2 = f , f is constant, and H is
concave imply, via Remark 3, that Assumption E is satisﬁed. We apply Proposition 2 to obtain the
following results:
If K1 = K2 = 0, then (t
∗
1, t
∗
2) = (0, 1) is the only pure strategy equilibrium; Note ﬁrst that if (t
∗
1, t
∗
2)
is an equilibrium, then t∗1 < t∗2. Furthermore, if 0 < t1 < t2 ≤ 1, then t1 cannot be a best response
of candidate 1 to t2. Finally t1 = 0 is a best response of candidate 1 to t2 = 1 and t2 = 1 is a best
response of candidate 2 to t1 = 0 since U1(·, 1) is decreasing and U2(0, ·) is increasing on [0, 1]. This
is the classic divergence result.
If 0 < Ki < 3/2 for i ∈ {1, 2}, then condition (b) of Proposition 2 holds. In particular, routine
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calculations show that α1 ≤ 0, if, for 1/2 < t2 ≤ 1, we have
2K1 ≤ 9/4 + t2 + t22.
The above inequality holds for any 1/2 ≤ t2 ≤ 1 as long as K1 ≤ 32 . Hence, K1 ≤ 32 implies that
α1 ≤ 0. Similarly, we can show that K2 ≤ 32 also implies that α2 ≥ 0.
Finally, ifKi > 3/2 for i ∈ {1, 2}, then it is straightforward to show that condition (a) of Proposition
2 holds, and (1/2, 1/2) is a pure strategy equilibrium for the game. Moreover, if Ki ≥ 4, then for
any t2 > 1/2,
∂U1
∂t1
(·, t2) ≥ 0 and for any t2 > t1, ∂U2∂t2 (t1, ·) ≤ 0. Therefore, (1/2, 1/2) is the only
pure strategy equilibrium of this game, and we have the standard convergence to the median voter.
5. Conclusion
Despite their intuitive appeal, error distribution models where the error term ξ is both additive
and independent of the announced policies can lead to logical inconsistencies. These inconsistencies
arise whether or not the policy space is uni-dimensional and regardless to what assumptions we
impose on the objectives of the candidates. Therefore, we introduce an alternative formulation
of error distribution models that does not require the additivity of the error term but maintains
its independence of the announced policies. For voting games between two candidates over a uni-
dimensional policy space -in addition to being logically consistent- this alternative formulation
provides a tractable approach to modeling candidates' uncertainty regarding the actual behavior
of the voters on election day. Most of the classic results in probabilistic voting models can be
reproduced as special cases of this new formulation. The formulation of the model, as expressed by
equations 2 through 5, remains valid when the policy space is multi-dimensional. For the existence
results we derived from such model, however, the uni-dimensionality of the policy space is essential.
Our model distinguishes between two diﬀerent types of heterogeneity among the candidates. The
ﬁrst type is the heterogeneity in the objectives of the candidates, which is reﬂected in the diﬀerence
in oﬃce motivation for the two candidates (i.e the diﬀerence between K1 and K2 in equation (16)).
Proposition 2 in our paper, Proposition 1 in Saporiti (2008), and Example 6 in Ball (1999) suggest
that when this heterogeneity is low, the voting game will have a pure strategy equilibrium. As this
heterogeneity increases, the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium becomes less likely. The second
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type is a heterogeneity in the beliefs the candidates have about voters' preferences and their actual
behavior on election day. On one hand, this heterogeneity allows for a richer representation of the
uncertainty facing the candidates. On the other hand, the presence of such heterogeneity rules out
the standard assumptions of Agreement and Unbiasedness used in most of the current models, and
the proofs of the existence of pure equilibria have to be modiﬁed accordingly.
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Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 2, we will need the following four technical lemmas. The ﬁrst two
translate the properties of winning probabilities into properties for the payoﬀ functions of the
candidates. The last two detail the roles of assumptions (a) and (b) in Proposition 2.
Lemma A1 Consider a game G that satisﬁes Assumption E, D, and F. The following must hold:
(i) the functions U1(·, tm) and U2(tm, ·) are continuous on [0, 1]
(ii) for any t2, U1(·, t2) is weakly decreasing over (t2, 1]. If, in addition, t2 ≥ tm, then U1(·, t2) is
weakly decreasing over [t2, 1]
(iii) for any t1, U2(t1, ·) is weakly increasing over [0, t1). If, in addition, t1 ≤ tm, then U2(t1, ·) is
weakly increasing over [0, t1]
Proof. The above claims follow immediately from Remark 1 and the facts that v1 is continuous
and decreasing on [0, 1] and v2 is continuous and increasing on [0, 1].
Lemma A2 Consider a game G that satisﬁes Assumption E, D, and F. For every t2 ≥ tm, U1(·, t2)
is concave on [0, t2), and for every t1 ≤ tm, U2(t1, ·) is concave on (t1, 1].
Proof. Fix some t2 ≥ tm. U ′′1 = pi′′1ψ1 + 2pi′1ψ′1 + ψ′′1pi1, where primes denote partials with respect
to t1. Therefore, the concavity of pi1(·, t2) (Assumption E), the concavity of v1 (Assumption F),
and the fact that pi1(·, t2) is increasing and v1 is decreasing on [0, t2) (Remark 1, Assumption
D, and Assumption F) imply that U ′′i ≤ 0 on [0, t2). Similarly, for a ﬁxed t1 < tm, we have
U ′′2 = pi′′2ψ2 + 2pi′2ψ′2 + ψ′′2pi2, where now primes denote partials with respect to t2. Now Therefore,
the concavity of pi2(t2, ·), the concavity of v2, and the fact that pi2(t1, ·) is weakly decreasing and v2
is increasing on (t1, 1] imply that U
′′
2 ≤ 0 on (t1, 1].
Lemma A3 Consider a game G that satisﬁes Assumption E, D, and F. If ∂U1∂t1
−
(tm, tm) ≥ 0, then
tm ∈ Argmaxt1∈[0,1]U1(t1, tm).
Similarly, if ∂U2∂t2
+
(tm, tm) ≤ 0, then
tm ∈ Argmaxt2∈[0,1]U2(tm, t2)
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.Proof. The assumption limt1↗tm
∂U1
∂t1
(t1, t
m) ≥ 0 and the concavity of U1 on [0, t2) -obtained via
Lemma A2- imply that U1(·, tm) is weakly increasing on [0, tm). Lemma 1 implies that U1(·, tm)
is weakly decreasing on [tm, 1]. Hence, tm ∈ Argmaxt1∈[0,1]U1(t1, tm). The proof of our claim
regarding U2 is obtained in the same manner.
Lemma A4 Consider a game G that satisﬁes Assumption E, D, and F. If α1 ≤ 0, then for any
t2 ≥ tm we have
Argmaxt1∈[0,tm]U1(t1, t2) = Argmaxt1∈[0,1]U1(t1, t2) (A1)
Similarly, if α2 ≥ 0, then for any t1 ≤ tm we have
Argmaxt2∈[tm,1]U2(t1, t2) = Argmaxt2∈[0,1]U2(t1, t2) (A2)
Proof. When t2 = t
m, (A1) follows from parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma A1. When t2 > t
m, the
fact that ∂U1∂t1 (t
m, t2) ≤ 0, and the concavity of U1(·, t2) on [0, t2) (via Lemma A2) imply that
∂U1
∂t1
(·, t2) ≤ 0 on [tm, t2), and U1(·, t2) is weakly decreasing on [tm, t2). Combining this with (i) of
Lemma A1 implies that U1(·, t2) is weakly decreasing on [tm, 1]. Hence, equation A1 holds. Using a
similar argument, we show, for any any t1 ≤ tm, ∂U2∂t2 (t1, tm) ≥ 0 on [0, tm] and equation (A2) holds.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, if (a) holds, then (t∗1, t∗2) = (tm, tm) is an equilibrium by Lemma
A3. Now assume (b) holds. Lemma A4 then implies, for any t2 ≥ tm,
Argmaxt1∈[0,1]U1(t1, t2) = Argmaxt1∈[0,tm]U1(t1, t2). (A3)
Similarly, Lemma A4 also implies that, for any t1 ≤ tm,
Argmaxt2∈[0,1]U2(t1, t2) = Argmaxt2∈[tm,1]U2(t1, t2). (A4)
Let Gˆ be the game that results from G by restricting the strategy sets of candidates 1 and 2 to
Sˆ1 = [0, t
m] and Sˆ2 = [t
m, 1] respectively. The payoﬀs of every candidate is now continuous and
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concave in his own strategy. Therefore, Gˆ has an equilibrium (t∗1, t∗2) in pure strategies by Proposition
3.1 in Reny (1999). Hence,
U1(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≥ U1(t1, t∗2), for all t1 ∈ [0, tm], (A5)
and
U2(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≥ U2(t∗1, t2), for all t2 ∈ [tm, 1]. (A6).
Since t∗2 ≥ tm, (A3) and (A5) imply
U1(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≥ U1(t1, t∗2), for all t1 ∈ [0, 1]. (A7)
Similarly, Since t∗1 ≤ tm, (A4) and (A6) implies
U2(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≥ U2(t∗1, t2), for all t2 ∈ [0, 1]. (A8)
Clearly, A7 and A8 imply that (t∗1, t∗2) is an equilibrium for the original game G.
To prove Proposition 3, we modify Remark 1 and Lemma A4
Remark 1′: Assumption D′ and equations (9) and (11) imply he following properties of pii:
i) pi1(·, tm1 ) and pi2(tm2 , ·) are continuous on [0, 1]
ii) For every t2, pi1(·, t2) is weakly increasing (i.e. non decreasing) on [0, t2) and weakly decreasing
on (t2, 1]. For t2 ≥ tm1 , pi1(·, t2) is weakly decreasing on [t2, 1]
Similarly,
iii) For every t1, pi2(t1, ·) is weakly increasing on [0, t1) and weakly decreasing on (t1, 1]. For t1 ≤ tm2 ,
pi2(t1, ·) is actually weakly increasing on [0, t1].
Lemma 4′. If α1 ≤ 0, then for any t2 ≥ tm1 we have
Argmaxt1∈[0,1]U1(t1, t2) = Argmaxt1∈[0,tm1 ]U1(t1, t2) (A
′1)
Similarly, if α2 ≥ 0, then for any t1 ≤ tm2 we have
Argmaxt2∈[0,1]U2(t1, t2) = Argmaxt2∈[tm2 ,1]U2(t1, t2). (A
′2)
The proofs of the above claims are essentially the same as the proofs of Remark 1 and Lemma A4.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the game let G˜ be the game that results from G by restricting
the strategy sets of candidates 1 and 2 to S˜1 = [0, t
m
1 ] and S˜2 = [t
m
2 , 1] respectively. The game G˜
has an equilibrium (t∗1, t∗2) (again by Proposition 3.1 in Reny (1999)). Hence,
U1(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≥ U1(t1, t∗2), for all t1 ∈ [0, tm1 ].
Lemma 4′ implies that, for any t2 ≥ tm1 ,
Argmaxt1∈[0,tm1 ]U1(t1, t2) = Argmaxt1∈[0,1]U1(t1, t2).
Since t∗2 > tm1 , we now have
U1(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≥ U1(t1, t∗2), for all t1 ∈ [0, 1]. (A9)
Similarly, Lemma 4′ implies that, for any t1 ≤ tm2 ,
Argmaxt2∈[tm2 ,1]U2(t1, t2) = Argmaxt2∈[0,1]U2(t1, t2). (A11)
Since t∗1 < tm2 , (A11) and the fact that (t∗1, t∗2) is an equilibrium of G˜ imply that
U2(t
∗
1, t
∗
2) ≥ U1(t∗1, t2) for all t2 ∈ [0, 1]. (A12)
Clearly, (A9) and (A12) imply that (t∗1, t∗2) is also an equilibrium for G.
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